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COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND SMES REVENUES IN IRELAND: WHAT’S 
THE GAP? 
 
Maria Martinez-Cillero, Martina Lawless and Conor O’Toole1 
ABSTRACT 
The COVID-19 economic crisis has caused an unprecedented economic shock for 
the Irish SME sector. In this paper, we assess the financial resilience of Irish SMEs 
and explore the extent to which they have faced revenue shortfalls (where revenue 
falls below expenditure on a monthly basis) since the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic. We also undertake a forward-looking exercise which attempts to 
quantify SME revenue shortfalls to the end of 2020 under three scenarios. We 
found that between two-in-five micro firms and one-in-two small/medium-sized 
firms faced a revenue shortfall from March to June 2020. This accounted for a 
revenue shortfall of between €6 billion and €10 billion for the period. If firms’ own 
cash resources bridge the gap, then between €2.2 billion and €4.3 billion remains 
unaccounted for. Looking forward to the end of 2020, scenario estimates for the 
gap are between €8 billion and €15 billion, depending on the epidemiological 
situation. Own fund usage can reduce this to between €4 billion and €8 billion, 
depending on the scenario.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic represents the most severe economic shock to the Irish 
economy in living memory. The speed and scale of the disruption to economic and 
social life are outside any experience bar wartime. While dealing with the health 
implications of the pandemic was the highest priority, the economic cost of the 
restrictions is substantial. An early estimate of the potential scale of the shock 
forecast for 2020 is provided by McQuinn et al. (2020), who suggest the economy 
could contract by between 9 and 17 per cent depending on the epidemiological 
situation with respect to COVID-19.  
 
The outlook for the economy as it exits the initial lockdown phase depends on 
continued suppression of the virus, which gives rise to considerable uncertainty on 




1  This work is part of a joint research programme on Taxation, the Macroeconomy and Banking between the ESRI, 
Department of Finance and Revenue Commissioners. We would like to thank everyone involved in the programme for 
helpful comments. In particular we would like to thank Eric Gargan, John Palmer and Fergal McCann for insightful 
comments. We would also like to thank the CSO and Chambers Ireland for provision of data. The views are those of 
the authors and not of the participating institutions.  
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With these uncertainties in mind, this paper attempts to estimate the scale of the 
revenue losses and liquidity shortfalls of the Irish small and medium enterprise 
(SME) sector. We do this both for the period of the stringent restrictions 
throughout the second quarter of 2020 and also across several outlook scenarios 
for the rest of the year. 
 
The SME sector makes up the vast majority of firms operating in Ireland and 
employs over one million people (68.4 per cent of total employment) according to 
the CSO (2019). While much of the prospects for the sector over the coming 
months depend very much on epidemiological developments and the scale of the 
economic shock, the resilience of individual firms and the SME sector as a whole 
also depends on the financial position entering the crisis.  
 
The paper therefore begins with a description of the performance of the SME 
sector before it entered the crisis period. To do this, we used detailed survey data 
on profitability, indebtedness, cash holdings and payment arrears across firms to 
gauge their potential resilience or vulnerability to a severe shock to their revenues. 
We particularly focused on the relationship between expenditure and turnover 
across SMEs and how much capacity did SMEs have to absorb shocks through their 
build-up of internal funds before the crisis hit. Following the description of the SME 
sector’s performance entering the crisis, we calculated the potential impact in 
terms of revenue shortfalls over the lockdown period in the second quarter of 
2020. We combined estimates of the range of turnover reductions from surveys 
carried out by the CSO and by Chambers Ireland with expenditure reductions 
coming from support schemes such as an illustrative wage subsidy (like the 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) or the Employee Wage Subsidy Scheme 
(EWSS) which replaced it in July 2020) and reductions in other input costs. It must 
be noted that we did not try and directly model either of these exact wage 
subsidies in operation, as we do not have employee level data which would allow 
us to do a microsimulation exercise. Instead, we used an illustrative subsidy that is 
based on the average earnings per employee at the firm. We used this survey 
evidence on the extent of turnover and expenditure reductions to calibrate a 
number of scenarios for our detailed firm dataset. This allowed us to examine how 
widespread revenue gaps were across firms and how these compared to the 
reserves that firms had in place to cope with a negative shock. We also aggregated 
across firms to build up a total estimate of the revenue shortfall for the SME sector 
as a whole – both including and excluding the sector’s own internal funds 
resources. The combination of granular data on cash holdings and the up-to-date 
input of turnover and expenditure shocks from the CSO allowed us to extend 
earlier work on liquidity for SMEs in the COVID-19 period (McGeever et al., 2020). 
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The estimates for the revenue shortfalls over the lockdown period have been 
extended to cover the full year 2020 under a range of different scenarios. Our 
central scenario is a gradual return to normal turnover for most firms by the end 
of the year with some ongoing public health measures (like physical distancing) 
continuing. A more optimistic scenario is for a rapid improvement in turnover 
throughout the third quarter, and a more pessimistic scenario has restrictions in 
place and has turnover improve somewhat in the third quarter of 2020 – but then 
stay at this level for the final quarter as well, although without returning to a full 
lockdown. These scenarios were used to calibrate the financial evolution of firms 
in the SME survey and results were then aggregated to give an overall indication of 
the range of potential shortfalls and the capacity of firms to survive them.  
 
The results are subject to considerable uncertainty, particularly in the case of the 
forward-looking scenarios which depend to a large extent on health developments 
and the control of the pandemic. Our key results suggest that between 40-55 per 
cent of micro enterprises experienced a revenue shortfall for three months to 
mid-June 2020. The median revenue gap per month for these firms was between 
€3,000-€3,500. For small/medium-sized firms, between 43-60 per cent of these 
firms faced a revenue gap with a median size ranging from €30,000 to €40,000 per 
month. Approximately one-in three micro firms, and two-in-five small/medium-
sized firms, did not have sufficient own resources to cover the three-month 
revenue gaps.  
 
Our next step was to aggregate these figures to provide estimates of the revenue 
gap for those firms who experienced a loss. It must be clearly noted at the outset 
that such a process is complicated using survey data and can lead to considerable 
uncertainty around any point estimate. Furthermore, our revenue gaps only relate 
to SMEs with a turnover less than €50 million due to the survey design. Our 
estimates would probably underestimate the gap (potentially by some margin) if 
larger medium-sized firms were to be included. Aggregating our figures for the 
revenue gap provides an estimate of between €6 billion and €10 billion as a result 
of the pandemic for the second quarter of 2020. Some of this can be covered by 
SMEs’ existing internal resources but, even assuming a full running down of SME 
cash resources, a revenue shortfall of between €2.2 billion and €4.3 billion remains. 
This is not to say that having SMEs use all internal funds in this way is desirable, 
particularly as it would have knock-on implications for their ability to invest and 
grow in any recovery phase, but it does show that some absorptive capacity existed 
within the sector prior to the shock. 
 
The range of estimates for the full year effect is much wider given the importance 
of the health developments in determining the recovery path. In our base scenario, 
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assuming a steady recovery over the second half of the year, the shortfall in SME 
liquidity is between €8.1 billion and €12.3 billion, however this declines to between 
€3.9 billion and €6.7 billion if SMEs use their own reserves fully. In an optimistic 
scenario of a more rapid return to near normal turnover levels, this revenue gap is 
between €7.4 billion and €10.7 billion (when accounting for own resources the 
figures are between €3.6 billion and €5.7 billion). A slower recovery would increase 
the shortfall considerably to between €9.5 billion and €14.9 billion. Depending on 
the scenario, the gaps are approximately €4.8 billion and €8.25 billion when 
accounting for own funds, as firms have to bridge a longer period of low turnover, 
and as any internal resources that helped to cushion the initial impact are run 
down.  
 
It should be noted that the estimates of gaps or shortfalls presented in this paper 
should not be seen as the required level of government support. Rather, they are 
estimates of the revenue gaps that firms will face under various economic 
scenarios. There is a very large range of options which can be drawn upon to bridge 
these gaps including the cash reserves that firms have on their balance sheet, 
drawdowns of existing loans, new lending from the private sector etc. 
Furthermore, if the economic shock persists many companies may not survive, and 
company closure will be one economic adjustment mechanism for firms with 
revenue gaps. State support (be it guarantees on loans, grants or equity transfers) 
will all be considerably important but will not on their own fully bridge the gaps 
suggested in this paper. Indeed, a large range of state supports have already been 
introduced, such as the enhanced credit guarantee scheme, lending facilities 
through the SBCI and a range of restart grants. These policies can act to address 
firms who have a revenue shortfall. However, the optimal policy response to the 
current crisis is beyond the scope of this paper but requires considerable detailed 
research and analysis over the coming months. 
 
The rest of the document is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the financial 
position of SMEs prior to the pandemic; Section 3 outlines our estimates of the 
scale of the shock and liquidity gap; Section 4 attempts to provide an aggregation 
of the firm level gaps; Section 5 presents forward looking estimates out to the end 
of 2020, while Section 6 concludes.  
2. FINANCIAL POSITION OF SMES PRIOR TO THE PANDEMIC 
This section documents the structure of the SME sector and its financial position 
before the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic hit. The primary data source we used 
for the analysis of SMEs in this paper is the Credit Demand Survey (CDS), carried 
out twice a year by the Department of Finance. The survey is documented in detail 
in Gargan et al. (2018) and Martinez-Cillero et al. (forthcoming). It contains a wide 
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range of financial and credit indicators, which we briefly overview here. Table 1 
shows averages of selected indicators of the financial situation of SMEs in Ireland 
in 2018, the latest year for which data are available in the CDS. We display this 
information by size2 and sector categories. The chosen indicators show that 46 per 
cent of SMEs hold some external debt and, of these firms with debt, the average 
ratio of debt-to-turnover is 16 per cent. The share of firms with debt is quite 
noticeably higher amongst medium firms than micro and small firms, which may 
indicate that it is easier for firms to access finance once they reach a certain scale 
or that debt financing has played a role in investing to expand operations. The 
extent of the debt held as a percentage of turnover is also larger for the medium-
sized firms. Across sectors, the share of firms with debt is highest in hotels and 
restaurants and manufacturing.  
 
Seven-in-ten firms made a profit, a share that is slightly higher amongst small and 
medium firms relative to micro firms but not substantially so. The percentage of 
profitable SMEs is slightly lower for the sub-sample of firms which have debt. The 
ratio of debt-to-turnover is steady across most sectors with the exception of hotels 
and restaurants where the ratio is considerably higher than average at 42 per cent. 
The share of firms making a profit is lowest in this sector at 58 per cent and the 
share of firms that have missed a payment on debts is highest. This is a serious 
concern in the context of vulnerability to the COVID-19 shock as the hospitality 
sector has been subject to the most stringent restrictions and is likely to have to 
deal with limitations on activity due to social distancing requirements for the 
longest. On the demand side, households are also likely to be more restrained in 
their activity to engage with this sector while the threat of infection continues to 





2  Throughout this report, size categories are defined in terms of number of employees. Micro firms employ between 0-9 
people, Small firms employ between 10-49 people, and Medium firms employ between 50-249 people.  
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TABLE 1  AVERAGE FINANCIAL INDICATORS BY FIRM CATEGORY 






% Firms with 
Debt,  




Total 46.0 15.6 69.4 67.6 4.5 
Size categories       
Micro 40.8 14.0 65.5 60.8 6.3 
Small 46.7 14.1 71.6 68.1 3.4 
Medium 55.9 25.7 72.5 77.1 3.0 
Sector categories      
Manufacturing 50.8 12.5 68.4 63.1 4.6 
Construction & Real estate 42.9 12.5 60.3 59.1 3.7 
Wholesale & Retail 45.6 12.4 71.3 68.8 5.1 
Hotels & Restaurants 54.1 41.6 58.3 56.1 6.1 
Professional, Scientific and 
Technical 42.5 13.5 77.3 76.6 4.8 
Other 43.4 22.2 72.9 74.8 2.3 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note:  The Debt/Turnover ratio distribution is capped at 5. The mean Debt/Turnover ratio is calculated using only firms with debt. Debt 
numbers include those whose debt has been imputed and therefore can differ to previous (or different metrics) estimated using 
this specific survey. For more information please contact the authors for clarification.  
 
We next looked at the relationship between expenditure and turnover across SMEs 
and how much capacity SMEs have available to absorb shocks in terms of internal 
funds.3 In order to explore the relation between annual turnover and annual 
expenditure we built a ratio as total annual turnover/total annual expenditure. An 
additional ratio built as the share of total annual cash and cash equivalents to total 
annual expenditure was also computed. The latter ratio indicates the overall 
capacity of SMEs to deal with potential income shocks by covering their annual 
expenditure using their available cash reserves alone.  
 
The histograms in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the total distribution of each ratio 
while the subsequent tables show the medians across firm groups. The histograms 
show that both ratios are extremely skewed, which is why the median is used in 
the tables following as the better representation of the standard firm experience. 
However, in later aggregations, we switched to using means to capture the fact 
that large revenue and liquidity gaps, even in a small number of firms, affect the 





3  Outliers have been removed in all continuous variables used to obtain the statistics presented (i.e. turnover, debt, cash 
and cash equivalents and expenditure). Observations are considered an outlier if they are above of the upper/lower 
1 per cent of the distributions. 
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FIGURE 1 RATIO OF TURNOVER TO EXPENDITURE  
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: Upper end of the distribution is capped at 15. Bin width is 0.2. 
 
FIGURE 2 RATIO OF CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS TO EXPENDITURE 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: Upper end of the distribution is capped at 2. Bin width is 0.4. 
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The median values of the total annual turnover/total annual expenditure and total 
annual cash and cash equivalents-to-total annual expenditure ratios are presented 
in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. Table 2 also includes the percentage of firms 
for which annual turnover was higher than annual expenditure in 2018, the most 
recent year of available data. Turnover was 60 per cent higher than expenditure 
for the SME sector overall and approximately 90 per cent of firms had turnover 
greater than expenditure. The difference in this ratio between firms with debt and 
those without debt is fairly modest, with firms with no debt having a slightly higher 
ratio of turnover to expenditure but also being slightly more likely to have turnover 
not exceeding expenditure. Across firm sizes, micro firms have greater ratios of 
turnover to expenditure and are also marginally more likely to have turnover 
exceed expenditure.  
 
TABLE 2 MEDIAN TURNOVER/EXPENDITURE RATIO, BY CATEGORIES 
 Turnover/Annual Expenditure % Firms Turnover > Expenditure 
  All Debt No debt All Debt No debt 
Total 1.59 1.56 1.65 89.9 92.5 88.5 
Size categories       
Micro 1.88 1.75 2.00 91.4 93.6 90.2 
Small 1.45 1.45 1.50 88.7 90.9 87.4 
Medium 1.33 1.36 1.25 88.9 93.4 84.3 
Sector categories       
Manufacturing 1.50 1.56 1.33 84.3 79.9 88.8 
Construction & Real estate 1.67 1.43 1.87 93.6 96.4 92.7 
Wholesale & Retail 1.79 1.75 2.00 90.2 96.1 87.6 
Hotels & Restaurants 1.80 1.83 1.79 92.1 93.4 89.8 
Prof. & Scientific & Technical 1.52 1.45 1.80 91.8 94.0 90.6 
Other 1.33 1.38 1.33 87.6 92.3 83.9 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note:  The upper end of the distributions of the Turnover/Annual expenditure ratio is capped at 15.  
 
A key indicator of financial resilience that we used to indicate ability to absorb 
shocks was the extent of cash and cash equivalents held by SMEs. Table 3 shows 
how much cash SMEs hold relative to their annual expenditure. The median firm 
holds enough cash or equivalent to cover 10 per cent of their annual expenditure. 
Firms with outstanding debt understandably hold less in cash reserves, at 6 per 
cent of annual expenditure compared to 18 per cent for firms without debt to be 
serviced. Micro firms tend to hold greater cash (which may be a reflection of their 
more limited access to external financing) than small and medium firms. In contrast 
to their higher levels of vulnerability shown in the earlier tables, the hotel and 
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restaurant sector does have a more substantive buffer of cash and cash equivalents 
relative to turnover than most other sectors.  
 
TABLE 3 MEDIAN CASH/EXPENDITURE RATIO, BY CATEGORY  
 Cash-Cash equiv./Annual expenditure 
 All Debt No debt 
Total 0.10 0.06 0.18 
Size categories    
Micro 0.13 0.07 0.22 
Small 0.10 0.06 0.18 
Medium 0.10 0.06 0.15 
Sector categories    
Manufacturing 0.10 0.06 0.13 
Construction & Real estate 0.10 0.06 0.12 
Wholesale & Retail 0.09 0.05 0.18 
Hotels & Restaurants 0.14 0.06 0.42 
Prof. & Scientific & Technical 0.15 0.10 0.22 
Other 0.07 0.05 0.13 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: The upper end of the distribution of the Cash-Cash equivalent/Annual expenditure ratio is capped at 2. 
 
FIGURE 3 NUMBER OF MONTHS THAT CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS CAN COVER EXPENDITURE 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: Bin width is 1. Capped at 24 months. 
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Another way of representing the shock absorption capacity of firms, in a more 
tangible sense, is to calculate the number of months that the cash reserves of a 
firm can cover their regular expenses. This is done by dividing the cash and cash 
equivalent amount by average monthly expenditure.4 The total distribution of the 
number of months is displayed in the histogram in Figure 3, again showing a very 
strong level of skewedness across firms. The percentage of firms that do not have 
enough cash reserves to cover even a month of their monthly expenditures in 2018 
is shown in Table 4. This table also provides the percentage of SMEs that reported 
having zero cash reserves. Close to half of SMEs have cash reserves that fall short 
of a single month’s average expenditure. Unsurprisingly, the median number of 
months cash that SMEs have which can cover monthly total expenditure is just 
above one. In addition, 4 per cent report no cash reserves available at all. Medium 
firms have slightly less cash cushions than smaller firms relative to their 
expenditure levels.  
 
TABLE 4 MEASURES OF CASH RESERVES, TOTAL AND BY CATEGORY  
 





No. Months Cash can 
Cover Expenditure 
(Median) 
Total 45.4 4.1 1.25 
Size categories    
Micro 42.6 4.6 1.50 
Small 46.6 4.9 1.20 
Medium 48.7 1.6 1.15 
Sector categories    
Manufacturing 49.3 6.6 1.15 
Construction & Real estate 47.8 4.5 1.17 
Wholesale & Retail 47.4 3.1 1.08 
Hotels & Restaurants 35.3 2.0 1.71 
Prof. & Scientific & Technical 34.1 5.0 1.75 
Other 54.8 4.5 0.80 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
3. ESTIMATING THE EXTENT OF THE SHOCK AND REVENUE SHORTFALLS 
Having provided an overview of the health of SME finances entering the current 
crisis, this section examines the extent of the shock and how it might impact firms. 
In particular, our aim is to give an estimate of the typical revenue shortfall or gap 
firms may be facing and the size of this on an aggregate scale. We define revenue 




4  To obtain monthly expenditure we divided total annual expenditure provided in the CDS by 12. We recognised that 
this even annual assumption will not be reflective of the seasonality of many SMEs’ actual activity. 
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a monthly basis during the pandemic.5 We therefore structured our scenarios to 
calculate how many firms have revenue fall below expenditure in each shock 
scenario and how much of this shortfall can be covered with their existing cash 
resources. From a policy perspective, we were also interested in how these 
aggregate across the entire SME sector, although the idiosyncratic nature of firm 
exposure and vulnerability along with the skewed distribution of SME financial 
structures demonstrated in the previous section gives considerable uncertainty 
bands around any aggregate values.  
 
In order to test how SMEs in our survey data would react to the extent of the shock 
posed by COVID-19, we set up a basic simulation exercise. In this section, we 
focused on the ‘lockdown’ period and presented estimates for the second quarter 
of 2020 (running from mid-March to mid-June in our simulation), which we 
calibrated using two different surveys of firms’ experiences. We then looked at 
extending the simulation to cover a range of scenarios for the economy over the 
second half of 2020.  
 
Our overall strategy was to take the SME structure and financial position from the 
2018 survey return and subject them to the following simulated shocks and then 
examine how this affected the financial position of the firms in the survey. The 
steps are summarised here and are described in more detail in the rest of the 
section:  
1. Applied a turnover shock to firms calibrated by survey evidence from the CSO 
and Chambers Ireland. Shocks differ across sectors but were applied randomly 
across firms within a sector. 
2. Applied a reduction to personnel costs to firms utilising a wage subsidy scheme 
(such as the TWSS/EWSS). We used CSO data on how many firms used the 
TWSS scheme and calculated firm-level usage based on employment levels 
collected in the CDS survey and other CSO data on the share of personnel to 
total costs in SMEs, in order to apply the relevant salary thresholds. 
3. Applied a reduction in non-personnel expenditure based on CSO survey 
responses to questions on non-personnel expenditure changes due to 




5  Expenditure in this case is both fixed and variable expenditure and we allow this to decline (as well as revenue 
adjustments) in line with the falls in expenditure for both non-personnel and personnel costs as outlined in the recent 
CSO survey. While we do not specifically model issues like loan repayment breaks or rate deferments, if such items are 
part of the firm’s reported expenditure in the survey, we allow these to change in line with how firms report their 
non-personnel expenditure has changed since the pandemic began. 
6  An important limitation of this analysis was that we could not distinguish between permanent expenditure foregone 
(because the business was not operating and did not need to use intermediate inputs for example), and expenditure 
reductions that are delayed (such as debt payment breaks) that firms will need to repay later.  
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4. Calculated how many firms these shocks applied to, how many had turnover 
fall below expenditure and how large this gap was for the median and mean 
firms. 
5. Provided an illustrative example by multiplying by the total number of firms 
from the CSO business demography data, to aggregate the average revenue 
shortfall to a SME total estimate for the whole economy. 
Turnover shock simulation:  
The first step was to simulate reductions in firm 2018 turnover reported in the CDS. 
We used two different sources to do this, the first based on the results of the 
Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey, carried out by the CSO,7 and a second version 
based on adapting the CSO results to take into account a survey by Chambers 
Ireland of their members’ experience. We drew on the CSO survey as our baseline 
dataset as it was the most comprehensive survey conducted to date and is 
repeated for each month April, May and June providing both reductions in 
turnover and expenditure by sector. This allowed us to create a shock for the three 
months April-June which is the average of the reported shocks.  
 
The reason for using the Chambers Ireland survey was that the CSO noted their 
estimates are likely to be affected by sample selection, whereby firms that were 
closed during the lockdown may not have answered the survey. This, therefore, 
would make their scenario more benign than was the case. The Chambers Ireland 
survey data for April showed a more extreme shock than the CSO’s and we used 
these relativities to adjust the sample for a more severe scenario, as it is likely that 
a more extreme shock would capture firms who were closed. 
 
Table 5 displays the results on the percentages of SMEs that reported their 
expected impact of COVID-19 restrictions on turnover averaged over the relevant 
CSO survey waves and varying by broad sector. As the survey requested firms to 
indicate bands of turnover reduction, we based the simulations on the midpoint 
percentage of each turnover bracket (as displayed in column 2). We allocated the 
turnover reductions randomly across the firms in the survey by sector. There were 
no data to date to ascertain which firms in the sectors had been most affected. This 
means that 13 per cent of firms in industry were randomly chosen to have a 
turnover reduction of 87.5 per cent for example.  
 
Table 6 gives a similar picture for the response when CSO data are adjusted 
downwards by the relatively more negative survey responses from the Chambers 




7  https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/bic19/businessimpactofcovid-19survey16marchto19april2020. 
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reduction was in accommodation and food, where the most stringent lockdown 
restrictions applied. Construction was also particularly heavily affected. For other 
sectors, the extent of the reduction in turnover was extensive but more varied 
across the percentage bands with only accommodation and food having all firms 
lose turnover. Other sectors, while encountering many substantial reductions in 
activity, still show some firms with normal levels of turnover and in some cases 
with turnover increases. This is particularly the case for the wholesale and retail 
trade where some of the loss of the accommodation and food sector demand is 
likely to have been deflected to.  
 
TABLE 5 BASELINE SCENARIO USING CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES 
TURNOVER, BY SECTOR (Q2, 2020), PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
Survey bands of 
reduced turnover 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
75-100% < normal 87.5 13 41 18 79 20 
50-74% < normal 62.5 16 19 16 15 10 
25-49% < normal 37.5 26 21 21 6 17 
10-24% < normal 17.0 17 10 11 0 19 
Normal turnover   21 9 17 0 29 
More than normal  7 0 17 0 5 
 
Source: CSO data provided to authors for shares across sectors. 
 
TABLE 6 MORE SEVERE SCENARIO ADJUSTING CSO DATA IN LINE WITH – CSO ADJUSTED SURVEY 
OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES TURNOVER, BY NACE SECTOR (Q2 2020), 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
Survey bands of 
reduced turnover 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
75-100% < normal 87.5 22 50 27 87 29 
50-74% < normal 62.5 32 35 32 13 27 
25-49% < normal 37.5 24 15 18 0 14 
10-24% < normal 17.0 13 0 7 0 14 
Normal turnover   7 0 3 0 15 
More than normal  2 0 13 0 1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using CSO and Chambers Ireland data. The Chambers Ireland data are only used to re-allocate the CSO data 
i.e. the Chambers Ireland data show a larger shock than the CSO. All CSO figures are then grossed down by these factors in 
aggregate while the sectoral relativities are held constant.  
 
Expenditure reductions  
Striking demand reductions are evident across all sectors in the previous tables, 
reflecting the dramatic extent of the shock across all types of firm. To estimate how 
firms were able to absorb (or not) this level of turnover reduction, we allowed for 
a calculation of a fall in expenditure during this period. We applied various 
expenditure falls which varied for personnel and non-personnel costs. Although 
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the CDS has overall expenditure data per firm, it does not have information on the 
types of expenditure (e.g. labour cost, materials, purchases, rent, mortgage etc). 
Therefore, we used CSO aggregate data to calculate a sector and size specific share 
of personnel costs of SME expenditure and applied this to the total expenditure in 
the CDS. 
Personnel costs 
Two different personnel expenditure reduction channels were calculated. The first 
came from the explicit subsidisation of wages via a subsidy such as that which is 
available through the TWSS/EWSS schemes. These schemes were brought in to 
enable firms to retain employees despite the reduction to turnover.8 After 
obtaining monthly personnel expenditure per employee, we constructed an 
estimate of eligibility for an illustrative subsidy which was built to proxy the 
TWSS/EWSS introduced as part of the COVID-19 measure. It was not possible for 
us to explicitly model these schemes as we did not have employee level data that 
would provide us with their employment status (such as part time, full time etc.), 
or their wage level. To illustrate the impacts, we instead used a proxy scheme, 
which was based on the average employee wage per firm in our data. The 
implementation of this illustrative scheme across firms in the survey involved 
several steps.9 
• We calculated the 70 per cent cap of the personnel costs per employee for the 
scheme. 
• We limited this figure to a maximum of €1,640 each month for each employee 
when 70 per cent of costs go over that amount.  
• We applied usage of our illustrative scheme to firms based on sector-specific 
percentages of firms which availed from the TWSS, according to CSO survey 
data as displayed in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES BY NACE SECTOR (Q2 2020), 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
  Industry Construction Wholesale & Retail 
Accom. & 
Food 
Availed of Revenue COVID-19 TWSS 52.2 65.7 59.1 54.9 
 




8  Details of the TWSS structure, eligibility and usage statistics are available from the Revenue Commissioner website 
https://www.revenue.ie/en/Home.aspx. 
9  The TWSS scheme relies on a worker’s previous wages and, as we do not have these data, we used an illustrative 
example which was based on average per employee subsidy. As we adjusted the rest of the personnel costs in line with 
the total reductions that firms themselves have indicated they achieved, this should capture issues such as top-ups 
above the TWSS. We did not model any tax implications for workers, for example PRSI, USC or income tax. Rather, we 
worked on a total gross wage bill per firm basis.  
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These percentages are applied to correspond with the firms which suffered the 
worse turnover shocks based on the two scenarios outlined above. This gave us the 
closest match to the actual share of SMEs that used the TWSS, as reported in the 
CSO COVID-19 impact surveys. In this regard, we do not explicitly model the 
assumption in the actual TWSS that firms have to have had at least a 25 per cent 
reduction in turnover, rather we allow sufficient firms to receive the subsidy under 
the proportions in Table 7. In practice, nearly all the firms in our data that receive 
a subsidy had a turnover shock greater than 25 per cent.  
 
The second channel again exploited the CSO survey. As firms have laid off workers 
and cut the wages of existing workers, as well as used the TWSS, we reduced the 
wage bill after TWSS by the proportions suggested in the personnel cost reductions 
provided in the CSO survey. Results are displayed in Table 8, by sector. The bands 
on expenditure reduction were broader than those asked relating to turnover. 
However, we applied the largest expenditure reductions to firms again on a 
random basis using the random split applied to the turnover scenarios, in order to 
assign higher unsubsidised personnel expenditure reductions to firms worse 
affected by the turnover reductions. 
 
While it is mentioned above, it must be reiterated here that our analysis is not 
meant as a microsimulation of the impacts of the TWSS scheme. As this scheme is 
applied based on each employee’s existing wage, we cannot use such a basis as we 
do not have individual employee-level data. Instead, our method provided an 
illustrative subsidy which is meant to somewhat mirror the TWSS. Our reduction in 
personnel costs then was a combination of an illustrative subsidy and then a 
decline in the rest of costs in line with the survey responses. In this manner, 
whether firms laid off workers or dropped the wages of existing workers did not 
matter for our analysis as we purely relied on firms indicated responses to how 
much their wage bill has fallen.  
 
TABLE 8 CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE, 
BY NACE SECTOR (Q2, 2020), PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
Survey bands of reduced 
personnel costs 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
50-100% < normal 75 4.9 11.4 13.9 64.4 6.6 
0-50% < normal 25 24.5 14.3 25.3 15.6 22.4 
No change or higher 
expenditure  57.1 45.7 51.0 20.0 60.1 
 
Source: CSO. 




Finally, we simulated two non-personnel reduction scenarios based on CSO 
published survey data, as displayed in Table 9. Since the expenditure information 
available in the CDS did not provide any details regarding the proportion of 
expenditure devoted to fixed costs (such as rent), or variable costs (such as 
purchases), we applied two reduction bands based on CSO survey data to account 
for the likely reductions in some of these expenditure items as a result of the slow 
down or cease in trading activity (see Table 9). We applied the non-personnel 
expenditure reductions to firms on a random basis using the random split applied 
to the turnover scenarios, in order to assign larger expenditure reductions to firms 
more affected by the turnover shocks. 
 
TABLE 9 REDUCTIONS BASED ON CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES 
NON-PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE, BY NACE SECTOR (Q2, 2020), PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDING ENTERPRISES 








& Food Other 
50-100% < normal 75 11.4 7.2 5.5 48.9 18.0 
0-50% < normal 25 11.4 7.2 18.8 24.4 24.0 
No change or higher 




After applying the various reductions to the different items outlined above, firms 
in the CDS experienced the turnover and expenditure reductions outlined in 
Table 10 under each scenario (information on the percentage reductions by sector 
can be found in Appendix 1). Average turnover reductions were higher in the more 
severe calibration, as it is to be expected. Turnover reductions in this scenario were 
over 10 percentage points higher. Personnel expenditure was reduced by almost 
half on average, and total expenditure was reduced by almost one-fifth.  
 














Total 42.4 56.6 46.4 16.9 22.0 
Size categories     
Micro 40.4 55.1 46.0 13.9 18.0 
Small 41.6 56.4 46.1 16.2 23.3 
Medium 47.0 59.3 47.8 23.5 28.4 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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Estimated average revenue gap  
Having applied the reductions in turnover, personnel expenditure and 
non-personnel expenditure across the firms in the data, we then calculated the 
percentage of firms who have expenditure greater than turnover and the median 
and mean amounts of this revenue shortfall. There are four sets of results 
presented in Table 11 on these calculations. This table displays the selected 
statistics by size categories. A table displaying the same statistics by sector 
categories instead can be found in Appendix 1. The top panel shows the results 
where the shocks are based on the CSO survey data. The bottom panel shows the 
results based on the more severe turnover shocks (i.e. calibrated based on the 
Chambers Ireland data). The personnel and non-personnel expenditure reductions 
were applied in the same way in both cases. For each of the two calibrations, we 
reported first the raw impact of the shock as the share of firms where revenue has 
fallen below expenditure and the size of the shortfalls. Secondly, we provided a 
figure for the share of firms who faced a revenue shortfall and who did not have 
sufficient internal cash resources to cover the gap for three months.  
 
In the baseline CSO calibration (top panel of Table 11), we estimated that 
approximately 39 per cent of micro firms and 43 per cent of small and medium 
firms had shocks large enough for expenditure to exceed turnover in the three-
month period of COVID-19 restrictions. If we base our estimates on the more 
severe scenario, these numbers increase to 55 per cent of micro firms and 60 per 
cent of small and medium firms. The size of the estimated shortfall in each month 
for the median micro firm is €3,000 in the CSO calibration and €3,500 in the severe 
calibration. Reflecting the highly skewed nature of the size and financial 
performances of firms (as shown in Section 2), the size of the revenue gap is much 
larger for the mean firm; more than three times as large in the case of micro firms, 
where the mean gap is €10,800 in the baseline CSO calibration and €12,600 in the 
severe calibration. The size of the shortfalls in both calibrations are larger for small 
and medium firms, with a median gap of €28,000 in the baseline CSO calibration 
and €38,000 in the severe scenario. The mean gaps are again approximately three 
times as large as the median. 
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TABLE 11 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE (GAP = REVENUE SHORTFALL) 
 Baseline CSO calibration 
 % Firms Expenditure > 
Turnover 
Median gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Micro 39% 3,062 10,789  
Small/Medium 43% 28,125 91,291 
 % Firms Gap > Cash Median Gap (3 Months) Mean Gap (3 Months) 
Including use of cash    
Micro 28% 14,902 39,644 
Small/Medium 39% 78,460 290,715 
    
 Severe calibration10 
 % Firms Expenditure > 
Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Micro 55% 3,573 12,610 
Small/Medium 60% 38,250 124,949 
 % Firms Gap > Cash Median Gap (3 Months) Mean Gap (3 Months) 
Including use of cash    
Micro 32% 24,881 47,873 
Small/Medium 41% 114,915 389,616 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
The next question is how much of these gaps remain if firms absorb some of the 
shortfall with their existing cash resources. We did this calculation by taking the 
firm-level gap just described and then subtracting the reported cash and cash 
equivalents. In the lower panel of Table 11, we report how many firms still have 
expenditure greater than turnover shortfalls after using their cash resources and 
how large this remaining shortfall is. In the CSO calibration, 28 per cent of micro 
firms and 39 per cent of small and medium firms still have a shortfall. The more 
severe scenario percentages reduce by more, bringing them closer to the baseline 
CSO numbers at 32 per cent of micro firms and 41 per cent of small and medium 
firms. We also re-calculated the median and mean revenue shortfall for the firms 
that were not able to cover the shortfall through their cash resources. In both 
calibrations, the size of the shortfall for firms that were not able to cover 
themselves out of cash resources was much larger than the initially calculated 
gaps. This is because it was primarily firms with smaller shortfalls that were able to 
cover themselves with internal resources and taking those firms out of the 




10  Calibrated using the differences between the CSO and Chambers Ireland survey shocks.  
19 
4. ESTIMATING A TOTAL REVENUE GAP 
The next step was to attempt to calculate an aggregate amount for the shortfall in 
revenues in the total SME sector based on the firm-specific gaps estimated in 
Table 11. This exercise was important in terms of policy interest in the overall level 
of exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic amongst SMEs. A degree of caution was 
needed however, as the design of the survey works best in calculations based on 
proportions and was not intended for aggregation of monetary amounts. Indeed, 
the survey only captures firms with turnover less than €50 million by design. This 
therefore would bias downwards any estimates for the SME sector as a whole if a 
strict employee definition (based on less than 250 employees) were to be used. As 
there are limited national data on total SME turnover and expenditure (for the 
sample of firms less than €50 million for which our survey represents), the 
aggregation was based on numbers of active SMEs in the CSO sectoral business 
demography data. Further details regarding the CSO table were used to obtain the 
number of active firms, as well as a detailed sectoral overview provided in 
Appendix 2. As many of the financial variables are very skewed, this aggregation 
approach should be treated as a broad guide to relative magnitudes rather than as 
precise point estimates.  
 
The approach to aggregation for each of the calibration scenarios can be 
summarised as: 
A. Take proportion of firms who have a ‘revenue gap’ (turnover less than 
expenditure); 
B. Calculate mean level of gap for these firms for the three-month period; 
C. Get number of affected firms based on CSO business demography data (see 
Appendix 2).  
 
The aggregate gap is given by inputs (A x C) x B. As with the firm-level calculations, 
we performed the aggregation exercise both for calibrations based on baseline CSO 
and severe scenarios. We applied the aggregation for the total revenue gap as a 
result of the pandemic and also the gap that cannot be covered by existing cash 
resources of the affected firms. The totals for each case are presented in Table 12, 
along with the totals for micro firms and for small and medium firms separately. 
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TABLE 12 AGGREGATED MEAN REVENUE GAP FOR THREEE-MONTH PERIOD (€ BILLION) 
 Baseline CSO calibration Severe calibration 
No cash adjustment included (€ billion) 
Micro 3.27 5.32 
Small/Medium 2.63 5.01 
Total 5.89 10.34 
Adjusting for firm cash holdings (€ billion) 
Micro 1.11 2.13 
Small/Medium 1.10 2.15 
Total 2.21 4.28 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
The scale of the shock to the SME sector of the pandemic is evident in these 
calculations, even given the caveats regarding their precision. The raw impact on 
SMEs in the top panel of Table 12 is estimated to be between €5.9 billion (in the 
CSO-calibrated shock) and €10.34 billion (in the severe calibration). In both cases, 
the split in the aggregate amounts are close to 50:50 between micro firms and the 
small and medium group (although of course there are many more firms affected 
in the micro group but with lower average shortfalls due to their smaller scale).  
 
The cash holdings of the SME sector can absorb some but not all of these revenue 
shortfalls. The lower panel of Table 12 shows the remaining gap after all internal 
resources have been exhausted. This still leaves a revenue shortfall of between 
€2.21 billion and €4.3 billion depending on the shock calibration used. Again, the 
impact is roughly evenly split across the two broad size categories of firms. These 
impacts relate solely to the three-month period of restrictions on activity in the 
second quarter of 2020. The next section looks at a range of potential paths for the 
economy and SME sector for the second half of 2020 and how these revenue gaps 
may evolve. 
5. RECOVERY PATHS AND SME REVENUE GAPS 
The path of the economy over the second half of 2020 is highly uncertain with 
health developments the key driver and considerable risks around any scenarios. 
This section is therefore highly speculative, but we feel it should be useful to 
present a range of scenarios that give some broad parameters as to how different 
economic paths would impact on the SME sector.  
 
In line with McQuinn et al. (2020) we presented three broad scenarios: 
• Base scenario: Gradual recovery with ongoing public health measures (e.g. 
physical distancing); 
21 
• Optimistic scenario: More rapid recovery towards normal turnover levels; 
• Pessimistic scenario: Initial opening up but no further recovery. 
 
The way in which we implemented the scenarios in terms of turnover evolution for 
firms is shown in Table 13. For the annual estimates, we assumed that in the first 
quarter of the year firms operated normally. In the second quarter, we applied the 
turnover reductions described in the previous sections calibrated to either the CSO 
or Chambers Ireland surveys. Table 13 shows these in the ‘Q2’ column for the CSO 
calibration and the approach is identical for the Chambers Ireland (i.e. more 
severe) shocks.  
 
The scenarios begin in Q3 where all firms experienced a step improvement in 
turnover and then recovery paths diverge in Q4. In the base scenario, we applied 
a steady improvement in firm turnover but one that is relatively slow. We did this 
by moving firms gradually up through the turnover reduction categories by one 
step in each quarter. This means that the 13 per cent of firms that were hit with an 
87.5 per cent reduction to turnover in Q2 (the midpoint of the 75-100 range), have 
turnover that is 62.5 per cent below normal in Q3 and 37.5 per cent below normal 
in Q4. In this base scenario, 71 per cent of firms were back at normal turnover 
levels by Q4.  
 
In the optimistic scenario, we allowed a greater bounce back from the lifting of 
restrictions, with firms moving up one step in the turnover shock categories in Q3 
and then two steps in Q4. This meant that the firms which were worst affected 
from the lockdown period had turnover that was 62.5 per cent lower than normal 
in Q3 and 17 per cent lower than normal in Q4. In this scenario, 45 per cent of firms 
returned to near normal turnover levels in Q3 (as in the base scenario) and now 87 
per cent were back at normal levels by Q4.  
 
The pessimistic scenario has some recovery in Q3, at the same level as in the base 
case. However, the recovery then stalls (for example if restrictions were 
re-imposed), and in Q4 firms remained as they were in Q3, i.e. at far below normal 
turnover. This results in only 45 per cent of firms being modelled as back to normal 
turnover levels by Q4. Note that our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios did not 
take the form of extreme ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case outcomes, with the optimistic 
scenario leaving some firms still below pre-COVID-19 turnover levels by the end of 
the year and the pessimistic scenario did not envisage a return to the level of 
turnover reductions during the lockdown phase.  
 
22 
TABLE 13 TURNOVER EVOLUTION IN RECOVERY SCENARIOS (BASELINE CSO CALIBRATION), 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES (ALL SMES) 
Survey bands of reduced turnover Q2 Q3 Q4 
BASE SCENARIO 
75-100% < normal 23   
50-74% < normal 15 23  
25-49% < normal 20 15 23 
10-24% < normal 14 20 15 
Normal turnover or greater  28 42 62 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
75-100% < normal 23   
50-74% < normal 15 23  
25-49% < normal 20 15  
10-24% < normal 14 20 23 
Normal turnover or greater  28 42 77 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
75-100% < normal 23   
50-74% < normal 15 23 23 
25-49% < normal 20 15 15 
10-24% < normal 14 20 20 
Normal turnover or greater  28 42 42 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
As turnover improves, we assume that firm expenditure also begins to increase 
(hence the scenarios are not simply scaled up versions of the one quarter estimates 
in the previous section). In terms of the illustrative wage subsidy scheme, we 
assumed that firms no longer qualify for the subsidy once they moved into the 
turnover category where turnover is 10-24 per cent below normal which 
approximates the qualification threshold for the scheme. For firms where turnover 
remained below this level, we assumed a subsidy scheme remained in place and 
applied this reduction in personnel expenditure across both remaining quarters for 
qualifying firms. Non-personnel expenditure was assumed to increase broadly in 
line with the recovery in turnover. Table 14 displays the average reductions in 
turnover and expenditure items for each scenario and each recovery simulation 
(sector-specific information in this regard can be found in a Table in Appendix 3).  
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Total 27.3 37.0 9.7 10.2 
Size categories    
Micro 25.7 36.0 7.7 8.1 
Small 26.3 36.7 9.3 10.9 
Medium 30.6 39.3 14.3 13.8 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Total 24.3 32.9 8.6 8.6 
Size categories    
Micro 23.2 32.1 6.9 6.9 
Small 23.8 32.7 8.2 9.2 
Medium 27.5 34.9 12.6 11.4 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Total 31.3 42.8 11.1 11.4 
Size categories    
Micro 29.9 41.7 8.7 9.1 
Small 30.6 42.6 10.6 12.2 
Medium 35.3 45.3 16.5 15.2 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
For each of the scenarios, we applied turnover (and associated expenditure) 
evolutions as above using the CSO-calibrated shares of firms in each turnover 
reduction bracket and did the same for the shares reported by Chambers Ireland. 
For each scenario, we applied the initial shock of Q2 and then grew forward 
turnover and expenditure across the remaining quarters of 2020. We then 
calculated how many firms had expenditure fall below turnover for the entire 
period and by how much. As before, we also examined how much of the shortfall 
remained after firms had used their cash resources to cover as much of the gap as 
they could. Table 15 shows the results for the CSO calibrated turnover reductions 
and Table 16 shows those based on Chambers Ireland. These two tables display the 
selected statistics by size categories. Tables displaying the same statistics by sector 
categories instead can be found in Appendix 3.  
 
In our base case of steady growth, 21 per cent of micro firms and 25 per cent of 
small and medium firms had a revenue shortfall over the full nine-month period in 
the CSO calibration, (if you recall these percentages were 39 per cent and 43 per 
cent respectively for the Q2 shock in Table 9). The size of the gap spread evenly 
across the months are quite similar to the lockdown estimate for micro firms (both 
in terms of median and mean). The gaps are lower in magnitude for small and 
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medium firms with a median of €20,000 per month in this base case compared to 
€28,000 a month for the Q2 scenario in Table 11. Due to the distribution of SMEs 
being highly skewed (i.e. there is a very large number of micro firms compared to 
medium firms, for example) the medians and means presented display large 
differences. It is clear to the reader that this would have implications when 
performing the aggregation exercise presented below (based on means). 
Therefore, as noted in the previous section, the aggregate results should be treated 
as a broad guide to relative magnitudes rather than as precise point estimates. 
 
TABLE 15 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH 
SCENARIOS (BASELINE CSO CALIBRATION) 
 
% Firms with  
Expenditure > 
Turnover 




No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Micro 0.21  3,859   9,222  
Small/Medium 0.25  20,934   71,620  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.21  3,237   8,357  
Small/Medium 0.26  16,935   65,720  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Micro 0.23  3,333   9,673  
Small/Medium 0.29  19,731   74,166  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Nine Months) 
Mean Gap 
 (Nine Months) 
Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO 
Micro 0.41  30,399   79,042  
Small/Medium 0.47  243,734   781,306  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Micro 0.39  21,453   76,040  
Small/Medium 0.46  204,823   753,284  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO  
Micro 0.40  36,430   94,862  
Small/Medium 0.46  272,909   827,524  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
A return to growth is therefore crucial in restoring SME health, although this 
relatively slow path in our base case leaves a substantial portion of firms with 
expenditure below turnover and an accumulating gap to be covered. As our 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios diverge only towards the end of the year, we 
did not find that they dramatically changed the shares of firms that have revenue 
shortfalls, although the size of the monthly gap was affected more noticeably. This 
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is particularly the case when cash holdings were considered as more firms 
exhausted their reserves and were no longer able to bridge the revenue shortfall. 
 
TABLE 16 PER CENT OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH SCENARIOS 
(SEVERE CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with 
 Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
 No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Micro 0.27  4,412   10,272  
Small/Medium 0.34  30,343   85,822  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.26  3,371   9,174  
Small/Medium 0.34  25,750   75,163  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Micro 0.30  4,723   11,030  
Small/Medium 0.40  31,771   91,958  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Nine Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Nine Months) 
 Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO 
Micro 0.43  59,349   108,533  
Small/Medium 0.55  264,032   827,882  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.41  46,031   98,625  
Small/Medium 0.52  202,281   743,404  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.42  56,468   120,592  
Small/Medium 0.54  333,686   907,545  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
The final step was to examine how these different paths for the rest of 2020 
aggregate into an overall SME revenue and liquidity shortfall. This was done in the 
same way as for the single quarter aggregation described earlier and the results 
presented in Table 17. The total revenue shortfall (i.e. not considering any cash 
reserves that could be used to cover it) is €8.1 billion in our base case using the 
CSO-calibrated shock and €12.3 billion using the more severe calibration. Adjusting 
for cash reserves, the base scenario gives a liquidity shortfall of between 
€3.9 billion and €6.7 billion. In the more optimistic scenario, these revenue gaps 
are smaller (with a range of between €7.4 billion and €10.8 billion), as are the 
liquidity gaps. The gaps in the pessimistic scenario are correspondingly larger with 
the liquidity shortfall coming in between €4.8 billion and €8.3 billion.  
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TABLE 17 AGGREGATE MEAN GAP FOR 2020 UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH SCENARIOS 
(€ BILLION) 
 Base Optimistic Pessimistic 
No cash adjustment (€ billion) 
Baseline CSO calibration 8.12 7.44 9.56 
Severe calibration 12.32 10.75 14.92 
Adjusting for cash holdings (€ billion) 
Baseline CSO calibration 3.87 3.60 4.80 
Severe calibration 6.7 5.69 8.25 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to the unknown path of the virus itself, which will determine much of 
the recovery outcomes, several other caveats applied to the analysis. The first set 
of limitations arose from the nature of the survey data we used to calibrate our 
scenarios and generate our picture of firm finances. Individual firms and sectors 
had different exposures to the shocks, different cost profiles and different 
underlying financial positions making one size fits all policy recommendations from 
the analysis difficult since the CDS can only generate an average picture. 
Implementing ongoing social distancing measures are quite different for small 
hospitality businesses than for office settings and these types of costs are not fully 
reflected in the scenarios presented. In addition, the total annual expenditure 
figure provided in the CDS may not provide a totally accurate representation of 
real firm expenditure, as there could be issues with how firms interpret this 
concept when asked. Therefore, some uncertainty in the revenue gap estimates 
presented could arise from the use of this variable. Indeed, the profit margin 
figures implied by the CDS are quite high, which may overestimate the extent to 
which firms have buffers available. Future work on this topic could benefit from 
using other sources of more accurate balance sheet data for Irish SMEs. 
 
Second, in all of our scenarios we included estimates of the extent to which the 
SME sector’s own internal resources could cover some of the shortfall. However, 
running down all internal funds is not an Optimistic outcome either for an 
individual firm or for the sector as a whole. While it helps to cushion the current 
blow, the longer-term outlook for the sector’s growth could be severely hampered 
in terms of limiting investment. Other work using the CDS by Martinez-Cillero et al. 
(forthcoming), shows many SMEs engaging in investment activities only when they 
had substantial internal resources available to finance it. The experience of the 
financial crisis may have left some scarring in terms of willingness to take on 
external debt, a consideration that is important both for the implementation of 
policies addressing the current crisis and for longer-term implications of having to 
meet the cost of the pandemic. 
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A third limitation is that we can only examine the impact on active firms and base 
this on their turnover levels prior to the crisis. The overall cost therefore does not 
include damage from lost potential growth opportunities, delayed or cancelled 
expansion plans or from potential entrepreneurs deciding not to enter the SME 
market in the current environment.  
 
Finally, our assumptions on expenditure reductions are implemented for each 
quarter but do not make any distinction between permanently foregone 
expenditure (e.g. inputs not needed due to lower activity levels) and expenditure 
that has been deferred but remains a liability to the firm (e.g. debt payment breaks 
or tax deferrals). A more in-depth investigation into expenditure categories that is 
not available in our current dataset would be needed to decompose expenditure 
further and gauge how much of the deferred expenditure may be a constraint on 
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APPENDIX 1  SIMULATED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, BY SECTOR 
 















Manufacturing 34.2 50.4 38.5 11.2 15.5 
Construction 57.6 71.4 47.2 7.3 18.9 
Wholesale & Retail 36.6 51.5 48.1 8.7 12.4 
Hotels & Restaurants 80.5 84.3 64.5 43.7 52.4 
Other 34.1 50.6 41.3 20.3 24.1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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TABLE A1.2 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE  
 Baseline CSO Calibration 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Manufacturing 0.39  19,604   63,920  
Construction 0.58  16,483   53,897  
Wholesale & Retail 0.38  17,221   56,267  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.61  18,337   59,852  
Other 0.32  16,516   54,004  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Three Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Three Months) 
Including use of cash    
Manufacturing 0.34  56,850   205,351  
Construction 0.44  48,937   174,088  
Wholesale & Retail 0.39  50,808   181,483  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.24  53,639   192,664  
Other 0.30  49,022   174,424  
 Severe Calibration11 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Manufacturing 0.64  26,460   86,754  
Construction 0.73  22,142   72,766  
Wholesale & Retail 0.54  23,163   76,075  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.62  24,707   81,077  
Other 0.52  22,188   72,917  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Three Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Three Months) 
Including use of cash    
Manufacturing 0.34  84,304   273,424  
Construction 0.45  73,093   230,871  
Wholesale & Retail 0.43  75,745   240,936  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.29  79,754   256,154  
Other 0.32  73,213   231,328  
 





11  Calibrated using the differences between the CSO and Chambers Ireland survey shocks.  
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APPENDIX 2 NUMBER OF ACTIVE SMES IN IRELAND 
The NACE Rev. 2 sector-specific number of active enterprises used for the 
aggregation performed in this analysis is one of the business demography statistics 
published by the CSO.12 The detailed sector disaggregation provided in the CSO 
table allows us to map the number of active firms to the detailed sector breakdown 
in the CDS. 
 
Table A2.1 shows how SMEs are distributed across sectors, displaying CSO business 
demography data on the number of active enterprises in each sector and the 
shares accounted for by each size category. In all sectors, we find a preponderance 
of micro firms, varying from 80 per cent in the hotels and restaurant sector, which 
has one of the greatest shares of small firms, to a level of 97 per cent in 
construction and real estate. Construction and real estate sectors have the greatest 
number of micro firms in absolute terms as well, at over 70,000 of the total 311,000 
SMEs. Other substantial clusters are in transport, storage and communications and 
in the professional and technical sector. There is also a large number of firms 
classified as ‘other’, showing the diversity of activities in which SMEs are active. 
 
TABLE A2.1 NUMBER OF ACTIVE ENTERPRISES BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE AND SECTOR 
 Number of firms Sector share (%) 
 Micro Small Medium Micro Small Medium 
Manufacturing  14,085  1,500  511  87.5 9.3 3.2 
Construction & Real Estate (F, L) 70,270  1,949  193  97.0 2.7 0.3 
Wholesales & Retail 42,170  5,581  747  87.0 11.5 1.5 
Transportation & Storage (H) 24,613  957  139  95.7 3.7 0.5 
Information & Communication (J) 14,777  897  230  92.9 5.6 1.4 
Hotels & Restaurants (I) 15,328  3,212  621  80.0 16.8 3.2 
Prof., Scientific & Technical (M) 41,531  1,790  222  95.4 4.1 0.5 
Admin. & Support (N) 17,366  970  297  93.2 5.2 1.6 
Health & Social Work (G) 18,213  2,147  525  87.2 10.3 2.5 
Other (B, D, E, K-642, P, R, S) 53,324  2,892  418  94.2 5.1 0.7 
Total 311,677  21,895  3,903  92.4 6.5 1.2 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 




12  https://statbank.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=BRA11&PLanguage=0. 
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APPENDIX 3 SIMULATED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, RECOVERY SCENARIOS, BY 
SECTOR 
 














Manufacturing 20 31 6.5 6.7 
Construction  38 48 4.3 10.6 
Wholesale & Retail 23 33 4.2 5.0 
Hotels & Restaurants 56 60 27.1 27.4 
Other 21 32 11.8 10.7 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Manufacturing 18.4 28.0 5.7 6.0 
Construction  33.7 42.3 3.8 8.3 
Wholesale & Retail 20.5 29.4 3.8 4.4 
Hotels & Restaurants 49.9 52.8 23.7 21.9 
Other 19.2 28.9 10.5 9.2 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Manufacturing 23.9 36.7 7.4 7.8 
Construction  43.5 55.1 4.9 11.7 
Wholesale & Retail 26.7 38.6 4.6 5.5 
Hotels & Restaurants 64.0 67.7 31.3 29.7 
Other 24.5 37.6 13.6 12.1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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TABLE A3.2 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH 
SCENARIOS (BASELINE CSO CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with 
 Expenditure > Turnover 




No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.23  15,128   50,405  
Construction 0.33  13,002   42,635  
Wholesale & Retail 0.24  13,505   44,473  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.24  14,265   47,252  
Other 0.19  13,025   42,719  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.23  12,278   46,216  
Construction 0.30  10,572   39,074  
Wholesale & Retail 0.23  10,976   40,763  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.29  11,586   43,318  
Other 0.20  10,591   39,150  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.25  14,156   52,238  
Construction 0.38  12,114   44,208  
Wholesale & Retail 0.26  12,597   46,107  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.31  13,327   48,979  
Other 0.21  12,136   44,294  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(9 Months) 
Mean Gap  
(9 Months) 
Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.38  171,200   542,536  
Construction 0.46  144,637   455,093  
Wholesale & Retail 0.50  150,920   475,775  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.45  160,420   507,049  
Other 0.41  144,922   456,032  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.33  142,477   523,021  
Construction 0.50  119,645   438,693  
Wholesale & Retail 0.48  125,045   458,639  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.43  133,211   488,798  
Other 0.39  119,890   439,599  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.38  192,506   578,419  
Construction 0.45  163,061   487,191  
Wholesale & Retail 0.48  170,026   508,769  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.43  180,556   541,396  
Other 0.41  163,377   488,171  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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TABLE A3.3 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH 
SCENARIOS (SEVERE CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
 No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.27  21,526   60,135  
Construction 0.38 18,298  50,728  
Wholesale & Retail 0.31  19,061   52,953  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.28 20,216  56,317  
Other 0.30  18,332   50,829  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.28  18,141   52,726  
Construction 0.35 15,355  44,510  
Wholesale & Retail 0.29  16,014   46,453  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.32 17,010  49,392  
Other 0.30  15,385   44,598  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.32  22,575   64,442  
Construction 0.42 19,207  54,365  
Wholesale & Retail 0.35  20,003   56,749  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.34 21,208  60,353  
Other 0.33  19,243   54,474  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Nine Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Nine Months) 
 Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.59  194,440   583,303  
Construction 0.49 168,953  493,733  
Wholesale & Retail 0.53  174,981   514,918  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.47 184,096  546,953  
Other 0.46  169,227   494,695  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.53  149,156   524,179  
Construction 0.50 129,701  443,894  
Wholesale & Retail 0.51  134,302   462,883  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.45 141,261  491,597  
Other 0.43  129,910   444,756  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.53  239,432   639,981  
Construction 0.47 204,914  541,993  
Wholesale & Retail 0.52  213,078   565,170  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.48 225,424  600,214  
Other 0.47  205,285   543,046  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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Firm level microdata from the Department of Finance Credit Demand Survey. Used as 




This monthly survey was instituted by the CSO following the pandemic. We use these 
data for the months of April, May and June which are three separate survey returns. 
We averaged these across the three months. The data on turnover decline by sector as 
well as personnel and non-personnel cost declines come from these data. The share of 
firms using the TWSS also come from these survey returns.  
Chambers Ireland 
Survey Data  
We used the percentage decline in turnover from the April Chambers Ireland survey as 
our adverse turnover shock scenario. It is an overall figure not broken down by sector.  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
